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Within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠare	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
substantive	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
discounting,	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠgoverned	 ﾠby	 ﾠOMB	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠsupport	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteragency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon.	 ﾠReconsideration	 ﾠof	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
subjected	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠdemanding	 ﾠand	 ﾠtime-ﾭ‐consuming	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠof	 ﾠinternal	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠ
potentially	 ﾠto	 ﾠexternal	 ﾠreview	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell).	 ﾠInstitutional	 ﾠconstraints,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
need	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠconsensus,	 ﾠcan	 ﾠimpose	 ﾠobstacles	 ﾠto	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠ
practices,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠin	 ﾠan	 ﾠarea	 ﾠlike	 ﾠdiscounting,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠonce	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
highly	 ﾠcontroversial.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch,	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠdecisions	 ﾠresult	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
substantive	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠand	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠtake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠform	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthree	 ﾠsets	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts:	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠopportunity	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠand	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠIn	 ﾠ
exploring	 ﾠthe	 ﾠworkings	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomically-ﾭ‐oriented	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠ
professors	 ﾠhave	 ﾠplaced	 ﾠfar	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmuch	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠand	 ﾠfar	 ﾠ
too	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠemphasis	 ﾠon	 ﾠa	 ﾠfar	 ﾠlarger	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints,	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠinterest-ﾭ‐
group	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠis	 ﾠat	 ﾠmost	 ﾠone	 ﾠpart.	 ﾠBecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠthose	 ﾠconstraints,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcostly	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
difficult	 ﾠto	 ﾠchange	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠtypically	 ﾠ
require	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠamong	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠpeople,	 ﾠwho	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhave	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠviews	 ﾠand	 ﾠwho	 ﾠ
have	 ﾠmany	 ﾠdemands	 ﾠon	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtime.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠofficials,	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠ
inertia	 ﾠis	 ﾠoften	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsidered	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdomain	 ﾠof	 ﾠregulation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠ
governing	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠis	 ﾠOMB	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4,	 ﾠissued	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2003	 ﾠ(OMB	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠ
was	 ﾠproduced	 ﾠby	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch,	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠdiverse	 ﾠparts	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠgovernment;	 ﾠboth	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠappointees	 ﾠand	 ﾠcareer	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole.	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠAdvisers	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠ
Affairs	 ﾠ(OIRA)	 ﾠwere	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠimportant.	 ﾠAn	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠversion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠpresented	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
public	 ﾠfor	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreview.	 ﾠOMB	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠcalls	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
discount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠ7	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(“whenever	 ﾠthe	 ﾠmain	 ﾠeffect	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠdisplace	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	 ﾠ	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 ﾠ	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 ﾠ
or	 ﾠalter	 ﾠthe	 ﾠuse	 ﾠof	 ﾠcapital	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠsector”)	 ﾠand	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ(“when	 ﾠregulation	 ﾠ
primarily	 ﾠand	 ﾠdirectly	 ﾠaffects	 ﾠprivate	 ﾠconsumption	 ﾠ(e.g.,	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠhigher	 ﾠconsumer	 ﾠ
prices	 ﾠfor	 ﾠgoods	 ﾠand	 ﾠservices)”)(OMB	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠEmphasizing	 ﾠboth	 ﾠethical	 ﾠ
considerations	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠuncertainty	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ
(Weitzman	 ﾠ1998),	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐A	 ﾠalso	 ﾠallows	 ﾠ“a	 ﾠfurther	 ﾠsensitivity	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠusing	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
lower	 ﾠbut	 ﾠpositive	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrate”	 ﾠwhen	 ﾠa	 ﾠrule	 ﾠ“will	 ﾠhave	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠintergenerational	 ﾠ
benefits	 ﾠor	 ﾠcosts”	 ﾠ(OMB	 ﾠ2003).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠguidance,	 ﾠcoming	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠTechnical	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠDocument,	 ﾠwas	 ﾠissued	 ﾠby	 ﾠan	 ﾠInteragency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠ
Group	 ﾠon	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠ(Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ2010;	 ﾠ
Greenstone,	 ﾠKopits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠWolverton	 ﾠ2011).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠIWG,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠI	 ﾠhelped	 ﾠto	 ﾠconvene,	 ﾠ
included	 ﾠrepresentatives	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠAdvisers,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠQuality,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠAgriculture,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Commerce,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠEnergy,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠTransportation,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠAgency,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠNational	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Energy	 ﾠand	 ﾠClimate	 ﾠChange,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠBudget,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Science	 ﾠand	 ﾠTechnology	 ﾠPolicy,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDepartment	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTreasury.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠoffers	 ﾠa	 ﾠdetailed	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange.	 ﾠ
Noting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠwell-ﾭ‐known	 ﾠdifferences	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠprescriptive	 ﾠand	 ﾠdescriptive	 ﾠ
approaches,	 ﾠit	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠ“primarily	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdescriptive	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠinform	 ﾠthe	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
discount	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrecognition	 ﾠof	 ﾠits	 ﾠlimitations,	 ﾠwe	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthis	 ﾠapproach	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
most	 ﾠdefensible	 ﾠand	 ﾠtransparent	 ﾠgiven	 ﾠits	 ﾠconsistency	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠ
contemporary	 ﾠtheoretical	 ﾠfoundations	 ﾠof	 ﾠbenefit-ﾭ‐cost	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
approach	 ﾠrequired	 ﾠby	 ﾠOMB’s	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠguidance”	 ﾠ(Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠ
19).	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠstates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠinteragency	 ﾠgroup	 ﾠhas	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠkeenly	 ﾠ
aware	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeeply	 ﾠnormative	 ﾠdimensions	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdebate	 ﾠover	 ﾠdiscounting	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠintergenerational	 ﾠcontext	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠconsequences	 ﾠof	 ﾠselecting	 ﾠone	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ
over	 ﾠanother”	 ﾠ(19).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠopts	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠspan	 ﾠa	 ﾠplausible	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
certainty-ﾭ‐equivalent	 ﾠrates:	 ﾠ2.5,	 ﾠ3,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠexplains	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ
corresponds	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠafter-ﾭ‐tax	 ﾠriskless	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrate	 ﾠand	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠreflects	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠ
possibility	 ﾠthat	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠdamages	 ﾠare	 ﾠpositively	 ﾠcorrelated	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmarket	 ﾠreturns”	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
“may	 ﾠbe	 ﾠjustified	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠthat	 ﾠmany	 ﾠconsumers	 ﾠuse	 ﾠto	 ﾠsmooth	 ﾠ
consumption	 ﾠacross	 ﾠperiods”(23).	 ﾠ	 ﾠThe	 ﾠlow	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠof	 ﾠ2.5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠis	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠreflect	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
uncertainty	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠrates	 ﾠover	 ﾠtime	 ﾠ(Newell	 ﾠand	 ﾠPizer	 ﾠ2003),	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
acknowledge	 ﾠ“ethical	 ﾠobjections	 ﾠthat	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠraised	 ﾠabout	 ﾠrates	 ﾠof	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠor	 ﾠ
higher”	 ﾠ(Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ2010,	 ﾠ23).	 ﾠThe	 ﾠguidance	 ﾠwas	 ﾠupdated	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013,	 ﾠ
maintaining	 ﾠthe	 ﾠthree	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠwith	 ﾠchanges	 ﾠnot	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠhere	 ﾠ
(Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
With	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbeen	 ﾠ
subject	 ﾠto	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠcriticism.	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠNordhaus,	 ﾠfor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠcontends	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
Circular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4,	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠOMB	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠis	 ﾠcompletely	 ﾠconfused,”	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠis	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 3	 ﾠ
not	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifference	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠinvestment	 ﾠand	 ﾠconsumption”	 ﾠbut	 ﾠinstead	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠ
premium	 ﾠon	 ﾠleveraged	 ﾠcorporate	 ﾠcapital”;	 ﾠhe	 ﾠadds	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ“the	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠare	 ﾠgenerally	 ﾠ
reasonable	 ﾠones	 ﾠto	 ﾠapply”	 ﾠ(Nordhaus	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠMany	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠbelieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠrelies	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠunreliable	 ﾠintegrated	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠmodels	 ﾠ(Pindyck,	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠand	 ﾠalso	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
wrong	 ﾠchoice	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrate	 ﾠ(Ackerman	 ﾠand	 ﾠStanton,	 ﾠ2012).	 ﾠOn	 ﾠone	 ﾠview,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
discount	 ﾠrate	 ﾠused	 ﾠto	 ﾠobtain	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠvalue	 ﾠ–	 ﾠ3	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠ–	 ﾠis	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠhigh	 ﾠfor	 ﾠethical	 ﾠ
reasons	 ﾠ(id.;	 ﾠsee	 ﾠalso	 ﾠStern,	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Let	 ﾠus	 ﾠstipulate	 ﾠthat	 ﾠa	 ﾠnew	 ﾠinteragency	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠdesigned	 ﾠto	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠfresh	 ﾠ
analysis	 ﾠand	 ﾠset	 ﾠof	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscounting,	 ﾠcould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠ
improvements.	 ﾠEven	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠdoes	 ﾠnot	 ﾠfollow	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfederal	 ﾠagencies	 ﾠshould	 ﾠinitiate	 ﾠ
such	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠdecide	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠto	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠwould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitiating	 ﾠthat	 ﾠvery	 ﾠprocess,	 ﾠand	 ﾠunder	 ﾠimaginable	 ﾠassumptions,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠworthwhile.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse,	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
significantly	 ﾠimproved	 ﾠjudgments;	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠit	 ﾠcould	 ﾠhave	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠSuppose	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
officials	 ﾠ(informed	 ﾠby	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠcommentators,	 ﾠincluding	 ﾠNordhaus)	 ﾠconclude	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
Nordhaus	 ﾠis	 ﾠessentially	 ﾠright	 ﾠ–	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠare	 ﾠreasonable	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthough	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠanalysis	 ﾠis	 ﾠ“completely	 ﾠconfused.”	 ﾠIn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠevent,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠargument	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠformal	 ﾠ
process	 ﾠwould	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠstrong,	 ﾠsimply	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠcurrent	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠ(by	 ﾠ
hypothesis)	 ﾠworking	 ﾠwell	 ﾠenough.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠofficial	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠshould	 ﾠavoid	 ﾠ
complete	 ﾠconfusion,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠif	 ﾠthe	 ﾠultimate	 ﾠconclusions	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠproducing	 ﾠbad	 ﾠpolicies,	 ﾠ
then	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠbest	 ﾠto	 ﾠfocus	 ﾠon	 ﾠother,	 ﾠmore	 ﾠpressing	 ﾠmatters.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Suppose,	 ﾠhowever,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠnumbers	 ﾠare	 ﾠnot	 ﾠso	 ﾠreasonable,	 ﾠor	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
with	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠclimate	 ﾠchange	 ﾠin	 ﾠparticular,	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrevision	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
order	 ﾠ(Stern,	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠPublic	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠconvinced	 ﾠ(perhaps	 ﾠby	 ﾠacademic	 ﾠ
economists)	 ﾠthat	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpractice	 ﾠis	 ﾠmistaken.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠso,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstakes	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠhigh,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠstringency	 ﾠof	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠenvironmental	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠproduct	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠthose	 ﾠmistakes	 ﾠ(cf.	 ﾠStern,	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠFor	 ﾠexample,	 ﾠregulations	 ﾠinvolving	 ﾠfuel	 ﾠeconomy	 ﾠ
mandates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠheavy-ﾭ‐duty	 ﾠtrucks,	 ﾠand	 ﾠenergy	 ﾠefficiency	 ﾠrequirements	 ﾠfor	 ﾠappliances,	 ﾠ
might	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠinsufficiently	 ﾠstringent,	 ﾠor	 ﾠunduly	 ﾠstringent,	 ﾠbecause	 ﾠof	 ﾠan	 ﾠerror	 ﾠ
that	 ﾠa	 ﾠsuitable	 ﾠinteragency	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠmight	 ﾠcorrect.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Even	 ﾠif	 ﾠso,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠconsider	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠinitiating	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
process.	 ﾠRecall	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlarge	 ﾠnumber	 ﾠof	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠInteragency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠ
on	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon.	 ﾠThose	 ﾠparticipants	 ﾠincluded	 ﾠpolitical	 ﾠappointees	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell	 ﾠas	 ﾠ
civil	 ﾠservants.	 ﾠWithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠvarious	 ﾠdepartments,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwere	 ﾠanswerable	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
Cabinet	 ﾠheads,	 ﾠand	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse,	 ﾠall	 ﾠof	 ﾠthem	 ﾠwere	 ﾠaccountable	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
heads	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠoffices.	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPresident	 ﾠis	 ﾠultimately	 ﾠin	 ﾠcharge,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
White	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠis	 ﾠitself	 ﾠa	 ﾠ“they,”	 ﾠnot	 ﾠan	 ﾠ“it”	 ﾠ(Sunstein	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠpoint	 ﾠis	 ﾠeven	 ﾠ
more	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠas	 ﾠa	 ﾠwhole.	 ﾠFor	 ﾠan	 ﾠissue	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
complexity,	 ﾠCabinet	 ﾠheads	 ﾠand	 ﾠleaders	 ﾠof	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠoffices	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
degree	 ﾠof	 ﾠpersonal	 ﾠinvolvement.	 ﾠSuch	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠwide	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠobligations,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
differing	 ﾠlevels	 ﾠof	 ﾠexpertise	 ﾠand	 ﾠcommitment,	 ﾠand	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠlight	 ﾠthing	 ﾠto	 ﾠask	 ﾠthem	 ﾠto	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 4	 ﾠ
spend	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠtime	 ﾠon	 ﾠreassessing	 ﾠa	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠof	 ﾠthis	 ﾠkind.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠbenefits	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠreassessment	 ﾠmight	 ﾠturn	 ﾠout	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠelsewhere,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠidea	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ“bandwidth”	 ﾠis	 ﾠexceptionally	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ(Mullainathan	 ﾠand	 ﾠShafir	 ﾠ2013).	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠcompounded	 ﾠby	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠconsensus.	 ﾠ
Institutional	 ﾠinclinations	 ﾠmight	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠdivergent	 ﾠ(and	 ﾠapparently	 ﾠfirm)	 ﾠinitial	 ﾠ
judgments.	 ﾠDiscussions	 ﾠof	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠwill	 ﾠalmost	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠtrigger	 ﾠstrong	 ﾠ
reactions	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠsome	 ﾠknowledgeable	 ﾠparticipants,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠin	 ﾠ
accord,	 ﾠcertainly	 ﾠat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinception,	 ﾠand	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠafter	 ﾠextended	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠterribly	 ﾠsurprising	 ﾠto	 ﾠfind	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠAdvisers	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠNational	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠCouncil,	 ﾠdrawing	 ﾠon	 ﾠstandard	 ﾠeconomic	 ﾠthinking,	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠ
something	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠ5	 ﾠpercent	 ﾠrate,	 ﾠwhile	 ﾠthe	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠProtection	 ﾠ
Agency	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠCouncil	 ﾠon	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠQuality,	 ﾠinfluenced	 ﾠby	 ﾠcritiques	 ﾠof	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
thinking	 ﾠand	 ﾠhighly	 ﾠattentive	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinterests	 ﾠof	 ﾠfuture	 ﾠgenerations	 ﾠ(Stern,	 ﾠ2013),	 ﾠ
favor	 ﾠa	 ﾠlower	 ﾠrate.	 ﾠThat	 ﾠdiscussion	 ﾠmust	 ﾠbe	 ﾠmediated,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠno	 ﾠself-ﾭ‐evident	 ﾠ
mediator.	 ﾠIf	 ﾠthe	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠa	 ﾠconsensus	 ﾠbreaks	 ﾠdown,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdefault	 ﾠwill	 ﾠof	 ﾠcourse	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠpractice,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthere	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠmakes	 ﾠsense	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
embark	 ﾠon	 ﾠan	 ﾠinteragency	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠwithout	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠconfidence,	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠ
will	 ﾠbe	 ﾠfeasible	 ﾠto	 ﾠachieve	 ﾠthat	 ﾠconsensus.	 ﾠTo	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsure,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠof	 ﾠachieving	 ﾠ
agreement	 ﾠneed	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠdecisive	 ﾠobjection	 ﾠto	 ﾠefforts	 ﾠto	 ﾠimprove	 ﾠa	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠflawed	 ﾠand	 ﾠdamaging;	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthat	 ﾠdifficulty	 ﾠmight	 ﾠwell	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠcaution.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
There	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠa	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠresulting	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠshould	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠ
to	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreview,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment,	 ﾠor	 ﾠboth.	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠboth,	 ﾠ
apparently	 ﾠon	 ﾠthe	 ﾠtheory	 ﾠthat	 ﾠthose	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠhad	 ﾠimportant	 ﾠ
information,	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfinal	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdocument	 ﾠwould	 ﾠbenefit	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
information.	 ﾠOfficials	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠhave	 ﾠbelieved	 ﾠthat	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreview	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠhave	 ﾠa	 ﾠlegitimating	 ﾠfunction,	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠor	 ﾠcongressional	 ﾠ
disapproval.	 ﾠNeither	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2010	 ﾠTSD	 ﾠnor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠupdate	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreview	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠadvance,	 ﾠthough	 ﾠan	 ﾠinterim	 ﾠversion	 ﾠwas	 ﾠsubject	 ﾠto	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠ(After	 ﾠ
both	 ﾠdocuments	 ﾠwere	 ﾠissued,	 ﾠnumerous	 ﾠcomments	 ﾠwere	 ﾠreceived.)	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
For	 ﾠany	 ﾠgeneral	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠfor	 ﾠregulatory	 ﾠpolicy,	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
people	 ﾠinside	 ﾠand	 ﾠoutside	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠwould	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠargue	 ﾠin	 ﾠfavor	 ﾠof	 ﾠboth	 ﾠ
peer	 ﾠreview	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment	 ﾠin	 ﾠadvance.	 ﾠWhen	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠworking	 ﾠwell,	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
internal	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠscrutiny	 ﾠcan	 ﾠproduce	 ﾠan	 ﾠadmirable	 ﾠform	 ﾠof	 ﾠ“government	 ﾠ
by	 ﾠdiscussion”	 ﾠ(Sen	 ﾠ2009).	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠrecall,	 ﾠin	 ﾠthis	 ﾠ
context,	 ﾠOscar	 ﾠWilde’s	 ﾠadmonition	 ﾠthat	 ﾠone	 ﾠproblem	 ﾠwith	 ﾠsocialism	 ﾠis	 ﾠthat	 ﾠit	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
“take	 ﾠtoo	 ﾠmany	 ﾠevenings.”	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠfor	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlong-ﾭ‐
term	 ﾠfuture,	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreviewers	 ﾠare	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiffer	 ﾠintensely;	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcommentators	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
certainly	 ﾠdo	 ﾠso.	 ﾠThose	 ﾠinside	 ﾠgovernment	 ﾠwill	 ﾠhave	 ﾠto	 ﾠevaluate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠunderlying	 ﾠ
disagreements,	 ﾠand	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠthey	 ﾠare	 ﾠprofessional	 ﾠeconomists,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
entirely	 ﾠconfident	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠright	 ﾠanswers.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 5	 ﾠ
Nothing	 ﾠsaid	 ﾠthus	 ﾠfar	 ﾠspecifies	 ﾠa	 ﾠrole	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ“politics,”	 ﾠor	 ﾠfor	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups,	 ﾠ
within	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠsuggested	 ﾠabove,	 ﾠeconomists	 ﾠand	 ﾠeconomically	 ﾠ
oriented	 ﾠlaw	 ﾠprofessors	 ﾠoften	 ﾠoverstate	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrole	 ﾠof	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
branch	 ﾠof	 ﾠgovernment.	 ﾠ(Outside	 ﾠobservers	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠsurprised	 ﾠto	 ﾠlearn	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
groups	 ﾠplayed	 ﾠno	 ﾠrole	 ﾠat	 ﾠall	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠdeliberations	 ﾠthat	 ﾠled	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠ
in	 ﾠ2010.)	 ﾠNonetheless,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠquite	 ﾠpossible	 ﾠthat	 ﾠany	 ﾠeffort	 ﾠto	 ﾠrethink	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠrequire	 ﾠat	 ﾠleast	 ﾠa	 ﾠdegree	 ﾠof	 ﾠattention	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠboth	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Legislative	 ﾠAffairs	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠWhite	 ﾠHouse	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunications.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
The	 ﾠformer	 ﾠoffice,	 ﾠentrusted	 ﾠwith	 ﾠmanaging	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠCongress,	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠinterested	 ﾠin	 ﾠknowing	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠthe	 ﾠenterprise	 ﾠwill	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠserious	 ﾠdifficulty,	 ﾠand	 ﾠat	 ﾠ
least	 ﾠfor	 ﾠsome	 ﾠparticipants,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠan	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠany	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠ
difficulty	 ﾠis	 ﾠworth	 ﾠincurring.	 ﾠ	 ﾠAlthough	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon	 ﾠreceived	 ﾠlittle	 ﾠ
congressional	 ﾠattention	 ﾠbetween	 ﾠ2009	 ﾠand	 ﾠ2012,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠwas	 ﾠa	 ﾠflurry	 ﾠof	 ﾠlegislative	 ﾠ
activity	 ﾠand	 ﾠconcern	 ﾠin	 ﾠ2013	 ﾠ(in	 ﾠthe	 ﾠaftermath	 ﾠof	 ﾠInteragency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup,	 ﾠ
2013),	 ﾠand	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠparticularly	 ﾠwelcome	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠactivity	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
concern.	 ﾠ(It	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠin	 ﾠspurring	 ﾠcongressional	 ﾠactivity,	 ﾠinterest	 ﾠgroups	 ﾠcan	 ﾠ
play	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole.)	 ﾠThe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠresponding	 ﾠto	 ﾠCongress,	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠthrough	 ﾠ
testifying	 ﾠin	 ﾠhearings	 ﾠ(one	 ﾠof	 ﾠwhose	 ﾠprimary	 ﾠpurposes	 ﾠmay	 ﾠbe	 ﾠto	 ﾠembarrass	 ﾠthe	 ﾠ
Administration),	 ﾠare	 ﾠreal.	 ﾠWhile	 ﾠthose	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠare	 ﾠmost	 ﾠunlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdeterminative	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
a	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠwhether,	 ﾠwhen,	 ﾠand	 ﾠexactly	 ﾠhow	 ﾠto	 ﾠproceed,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠnot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
entirely	 ﾠirrelevant	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcalculus.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠaddition,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠCommunications	 ﾠmust	 ﾠmanage	 ﾠrelationships	 ﾠwith	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠmedia.	 ﾠAs	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcase	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠLegislative	 ﾠAffairs,	 ﾠthat	 ﾠoffice	 ﾠis	 ﾠnot	 ﾠlikely	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
play	 ﾠa	 ﾠsignificant	 ﾠrole	 ﾠwith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠsome	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠmay	 ﾠnot	 ﾠ
be	 ﾠindifferent	 ﾠto	 ﾠthe	 ﾠquestion	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠnecessary	 ﾠor	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠto	 ﾠcreate	 ﾠsome	 ﾠ
kind	 ﾠof	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠstir,	 ﾠespecially	 ﾠon	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠquestions.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠ“bandwidth”	 ﾠissue	 ﾠmight	 ﾠbe	 ﾠ
relevant	 ﾠhere	 ﾠas	 ﾠwell.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
This	 ﾠunderstanding	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠof	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠexecutive	 ﾠbranch	 ﾠ
raises	 ﾠan	 ﾠobvious	 ﾠquestion,	 ﾠwhich	 ﾠis	 ﾠwhether	 ﾠexisting	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠare	 ﾠexcessive,	 ﾠ
insufficient,	 ﾠor	 ﾠoptimal.	 ﾠA	 ﾠcentral	 ﾠgoal	 ﾠof	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠprocesses	 ﾠis	 ﾠto	 ﾠminimize	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsum	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
error	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠand	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠcosts.	 ﾠMore	 ﾠstreamlined	 ﾠprocesses,	 ﾠreducing	 ﾠdecision	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠ
would	 ﾠmake	 ﾠit	 ﾠeasier	 ﾠto	 ﾠovercome	 ﾠinertia,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠalso	 ﾠincrease	 ﾠthe	 ﾠlikelihood	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠerror	 ﾠ(understood	 ﾠin	 ﾠpurely	 ﾠtechnical	 ﾠterms).	 ﾠIn	 ﾠprinciple,	 ﾠit	 ﾠmight	 ﾠseem	 ﾠbest	 ﾠto	 ﾠ
reserve	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocess	 ﾠto	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠspecialists	 ﾠand	 ﾠto	 ﾠlet	 ﾠthem	 ﾠmake	 ﾠthe	 ﾠappropriate	 ﾠ
substantive	 ﾠjudgments	 ﾠ(subject	 ﾠperhaps	 ﾠto	 ﾠpeer	 ﾠreview	 ﾠand	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠcomment).	 ﾠIt	 ﾠ
must	 ﾠbe	 ﾠacknowledged	 ﾠthat	 ﾠsome	 ﾠpeople	 ﾠwho	 ﾠare	 ﾠinvolved	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠassessment	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
discount	 ﾠrates,	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsocial	 ﾠcost	 ﾠof	 ﾠcarbon,	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠtopics	 ﾠare	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠobservers	 ﾠ
rather	 ﾠthan	 ﾠgenuine	 ﾠspecialists.	 ﾠAt	 ﾠthe	 ﾠsame	 ﾠtime,	 ﾠthere	 ﾠis	 ﾠa	 ﾠrisk	 ﾠthat	 ﾠspecialists	 ﾠwill	 ﾠ
miss	 ﾠsomething	 ﾠof	 ﾠimportance	 ﾠor	 ﾠrelevance,	 ﾠand	 ﾠhence	 ﾠthe	 ﾠinclusion	 ﾠof	 ﾠinformed	 ﾠ
observers	 ﾠmay	 ﾠhelp	 ﾠto	 ﾠreduce	 ﾠerrors.	 ﾠA	 ﾠparticular	 ﾠjudgment	 ﾠabout	 ﾠthe	 ﾠoptimal	 ﾠlevel	 ﾠ
of	 ﾠ“government	 ﾠby	 ﾠdiscussion,”	 ﾠin	 ﾠa	 ﾠsystem	 ﾠthat	 ﾠis	 ﾠabstractly	 ﾠcommitted	 ﾠto	 ﾠthat	 ﾠidea,	 ﾠ
cannot	 ﾠbe	 ﾠdefended	 ﾠin	 ﾠthe	 ﾠabstract.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 6	 ﾠ
In	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠprocedural	 ﾠchecks	 ﾠoutlined	 ﾠhere,	 ﾠpublic	 ﾠofficials	 ﾠmust	 ﾠoften	 ﾠ
think	 ﾠsome	 ﾠversion	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠold	 ﾠadage,	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠit	 ﾠain’t	 ﾠbroke,	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠfix	 ﾠit.”	 ﾠIn	 ﾠview	 ﾠof	 ﾠtheir	 ﾠ
particular	 ﾠrole,	 ﾠthey	 ﾠmight	 ﾠsometimes	 ﾠeven	 ﾠthink,	 ﾠ“if	 ﾠit	 ﾠain’t	 ﾠbadly	 ﾠbroke,	 ﾠdon’t	 ﾠget	 ﾠ
anywhere	 ﾠnear	 ﾠit.”	 ﾠWith	 ﾠrespect	 ﾠto	 ﾠdiscount	 ﾠrates	 ﾠand	 ﾠrelated	 ﾠtopics,	 ﾠit	 ﾠis	 ﾠtrue	 ﾠthat	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠinstitutional	 ﾠconstraints	 ﾠdiscussed	 ﾠhere	 ﾠcan	 ﾠlead	 ﾠto	 ﾠa	 ﾠkind	 ﾠof	 ﾠinertia.	 ﾠIt	 ﾠis	 ﾠalso	 ﾠ
true	 ﾠthat	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠsuch	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠshould	 ﾠoften	 ﾠbe,	 ﾠand	 ﾠoften	 ﾠis,	 ﾠovercome,	 ﾠ
because	 ﾠthe	 ﾠrelevant	 ﾠcosts,	 ﾠeven	 ﾠif	 ﾠreal,	 ﾠare	 ﾠfar	 ﾠfrom	 ﾠsufficient	 ﾠto	 ﾠjustify	 ﾠmaintaining	 ﾠ
an	 ﾠimperfect	 ﾠor	 ﾠdamaging	 ﾠstatus	 ﾠquo.	 ﾠBut	 ﾠwithin	 ﾠgovernment,	 ﾠinertia	 ﾠcan	 ﾠbe	 ﾠa	 ﾠ
product	 ﾠnot	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠbehavioral	 ﾠbias,	 ﾠbut	 ﾠof	 ﾠa	 ﾠvivid	 ﾠawareness	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠfull	 ﾠrange	 ﾠof	 ﾠcosts	 ﾠ
and	 ﾠbenefits.	 ﾠ






Ackerman,	 ﾠFrank	 ﾠand	 ﾠElizabeth	 ﾠA.	 ﾠStanton.	 ﾠ2012.	 ﾠ“Climate	 ﾠRisks	 ﾠand	 ﾠCarbon	 ﾠ
Prices:	 ﾠRevising	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon.”	 ﾠEconomics:	 ﾠThe	 ﾠOpen-ﾭ‐	 ﾠAccess,	 ﾠOpen-ﾭ‐
Assessment	 ﾠE-ﾭ‐Journal	 ﾠ6(2012-ﾭ‐10):	 ﾠ1–25.	 ﾠhttp://dx.doi.org/10.5018/	 ﾠeconomics-ﾭ‐
ejournal.ja.2012-ﾭ‐10.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Greenstone,	 ﾠMichael,	 ﾠElizabeth	 ﾠKopits,	 ﾠand	 ﾠAnn	 ﾠWolverton.	 ﾠ2011.	 ﾠ“Estimating	 ﾠ
the	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠUse	 ﾠin	 ﾠU.S.	 ﾠFederal	 ﾠRulemakings:	 ﾠA	 ﾠSummary	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Interpretation.”	 ﾠNBER	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠPaper	 ﾠNo.	 ﾠ16913.	 ﾠhttp://www.nber.org/papers/	 ﾠ
w16913.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠon	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon,	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ
Government.	 ﾠ2010.	 ﾠ“Technical	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠDocument:	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon	 ﾠfor	 ﾠ
Regulatory	 ﾠImpact	 ﾠAnalysis	 ﾠUnder	 ﾠExecutive	 ﾠOrder	 ﾠ12866.”	 ﾠ
http://www.epa.gov/otaq/climate/regulations/scc-ﾭ‐tsd.pdf.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Interagency	 ﾠWorking	 ﾠGroup	 ﾠon	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠCost	 ﾠof	 ﾠCarbon,	 ﾠUnited	 ﾠStates	 ﾠ
Government.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ“Technical	 ﾠSupport	 ﾠDocument:	 ﾠ-ﾭ‐Technical	 ﾠUpdate	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠSocial	 ﾠ




Mullainathan,	 ﾠSendhil	 ﾠand	 ﾠEldar	 ﾠShafir.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠScarcity:	 ﾠWhy	 ﾠHaving	 ﾠToo	 ﾠLittle	 ﾠ
Means	 ﾠSo	 ﾠMuch.	 ﾠNew	 ﾠYork:	 ﾠTimes	 ﾠBooks.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Newell,	 ﾠRichard	 ﾠG.,	 ﾠand	 ﾠWilliam	 ﾠA.	 ﾠPizer.	 ﾠ2003.	 ﾠ“Discounting	 ﾠthe	 ﾠDistant	 ﾠ
Future:	 ﾠHow	 ﾠMuch	 ﾠDo	 ﾠUncertain	 ﾠRates	 ﾠIncrease	 ﾠValuations?”	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠ
Environmental	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠand	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠ46	 ﾠ(1):	 ﾠ52–71.	 ﾠ
.	 ﾠ
Nordhaus,	 ﾠWilliam.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠClimate	 ﾠCasino:	 ﾠRisk,	 ﾠUncertainty,	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Economics	 ﾠfor	 ﾠa	 ﾠWarming	 ﾠWorld.	 ﾠNew	 ﾠHaven:	 ﾠYale	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠPress.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Office	 ﾠof	 ﾠManagement	 ﾠand	 ﾠBudget.	 ﾠ2003.	 ﾠCircular	 ﾠA-ﾭ‐4.	 ﾠ
http://www.whitehouse.gov/omb/circulars_a004_a-ﾭ‐4.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Pindyck,	 ﾠRobert.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ“Climate	 ﾠChange	 ﾠPolicy:	 ﾠWhat	 ﾠDo	 ﾠthe	 ﾠModels	 ﾠTell	 ﾠUs?"	 ﾠ
Journal	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠLiterature,	 ﾠ51(3):	 ﾠ860-ﾭ‐72.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Sen,	 ﾠAmartya.	 ﾠ2009.	 ﾠThe	 ﾠIdea	 ﾠof	 ﾠJustice.	 ﾠCambridge,	 ﾠMA:	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠUniversity	 ﾠ
Press.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ	 ﾠ 8	 ﾠ
Stern,	 ﾠNicholas.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠStructure	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠModeling	 ﾠof	 ﾠthe	 ﾠPotential	 ﾠ
Impacts	 ﾠof	 ﾠClimate	 ﾠChange:	 ﾠGrafting	 ﾠGross	 ﾠUnderestimation	 ﾠof	 ﾠRisk	 ﾠonto	 ﾠAlready	 ﾠ
Narrow	 ﾠScience	 ﾠModels.”	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠEconomic	 ﾠLiterature	 ﾠ51	 ﾠ(3):	 ﾠ838–59.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Sunstein,	 ﾠCass	 ﾠR.	 ﾠ2013.	 ﾠ“The	 ﾠOffice	 ﾠof	 ﾠInformation	 ﾠand	 ﾠRegulatory	 ﾠAffairs:	 ﾠ
Myths	 ﾠand	 ﾠRealities.”	 ﾠHarvard	 ﾠLaw	 ﾠReview	 ﾠ126	 ﾠ(6):	 ﾠ1838–78.	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
Weitzman,	 ﾠMartin	 ﾠL.	 ﾠ1998.	 ﾠ“Why	 ﾠthe	 ﾠFar-ﾭ‐Distant	 ﾠFuture	 ﾠShould	 ﾠBe	 ﾠ
Discounted	 ﾠat	 ﾠIts	 ﾠLowest	 ﾠPossible	 ﾠRate.”	 ﾠJournal	 ﾠof	 ﾠEnvironmental	 ﾠEconomics	 ﾠand	 ﾠ
Management.	 ﾠ36	 ﾠ(3):	 ﾠ201–08.	 ﾠ	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ
	 ﾠ